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AFTER THE DNA WARS:
SKIRMISHING WITH NRC II
Richard Lempert*
ABSTRACT: This article traces some of the controversies surrounding DNA evidence
and argues that although many have been laid to rest by scientific developments
confirmed in the National Research Council's second DNA report, there remain several
problems which are likely to lead to continued questioning of standard ways prosecutors

present DNA evidence. Although much about the report is to be commended, it falls
short in several ways, the most important of which is in its support for presenting
random match probabilities independent of plausible error rates. The article argues that
although one can sympathize with the NRC committee's decision as an effort to say no
more than what science reliably tells us, it is not a good forensic science recommenda?
tion because following it means that the probative value of DNA evidence is likely to
be substantially overstated. Fortunately, it will be the rare case where this matters.

CITATION: Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC II, 37
Jurimetrics J. 439-468 (1997).
The "DNA Wars," we are told, are over. Two of the key, and at times most
effective, participants in the battle, the FBI's Bruce Budowle and the leading

early scientific skeptic, Eric Lander, have declared a private truce and

?Richard Lempert is the Francis A. Allen Professor at the University of Michigan Law
School and Professor and Chair in the University of Michigan's Department of Sociology. He
served on the committee that produced the National Research Council's first DNA report.
Professor Lempert notes that the paper began as a presentation at meetings jointly organized
by the Eastern North American Region of the International Biometrie Society, the Institute of
Mathematical Statistics, and the American Statistical Association at Richmond, Virginia, in March
1996. He is grateful to Shari Diamond and David Kaye, both of whom served on the committee
that produced the National Research Council's second DNA report, for their comments on an
earlier draft of this paper and also to Jonathan Koehler and Michael Sobel for their comments. A
slightly different version of this paper appears in the Israel Law Review under the title, After the

DNA Wars: A Mopping Up Operation.

SUMMER 1997 439

Lempert
suggested that all are included.1 The controversial report of the first National

Research Council Committee on DNA Evidence2 has in crucial respects been
replaced by a second report3 that has debuted to far better reviews than its
predecessor4 and is likely to erase the earlier report's influence as courts

grapple with DNA evidence. Yet NRC II, despite its virtues, does not

adequately resolve all questions about the significance of DNA evidence, and
some veterans of the DNA wars are not yet content to lay down their arms.5 We
can better understand why the Landers-Budowle truce and NRC II may not
resolve all conflict if we first understand why disputes over the population
genetics and statistical issues raised by the forensic use of DNA identification
evidence became so heated that antagonists and observers came to speak of the

"DNA Wars."

One explanation for the heatedness of the scientific dispute over the
probative value of DNA evidence is that it was fueled by passions common
when civil libertarians are arraigned on one side of an issue and law and order

advocates on the other. Although some prosecutors who fought for the
admissibility of DNA evidence acted as if those who questioned the scientific
case for DNA evidence were opening prison cells for guilty defendants, I do not
believe these differences were the prime motivators of the scientific debate.
Among the scientists who helped make the case for DNA evidence, I am sure
there are many who are devoted civil libertarians, and among the ranks of those
who have questioned aspects of the forensic use of DNA evidence, there is no

one I know who takes pleasure in seeing the guilty go free. Nor do I think

1. E.S. Lander & B. Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid To Rest, 371 nature 735

(1994).

2. National Research Council Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science,
DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992) [hereinafter NRC I]. I served on the panel that
produced this report. I have also been critical of certain of its aspects. Richard Lempert, DNA,

Science and the Law: Two Cheers for the Ceiling Principle, 34 jurimetrics j. 41-57 (1993).

3. National Research Council Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update,
The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1996) [hereinafter NRC II].
4. See B.S. Weir, The Second National Research Council Report on Forensic DNA Evidence,
59 Am. j. Hum. Genetics 497-500 (1996) (invited editorial). Although Weir quarrels with some
aspects of the report, he concludes: "(T]he 1996 report will be a valuable resource to the forensic

and legal communities. The authors of the 1996 report are to be congratulated on their efforts to
make recommendations on the basis of scientific arguments. They have done much to help the
proper calculation and presentation of DNA-profile statistics, and the day on which DNA profiles
are employed with the same trust as are fingerprints has surely been brought forward by their
report.'' Id. at 500. An early news report in Science notes that NRC II is distinguished from NRC
I in that its release seems to have set off no fierce debates. The report notes that "DNA forensics
experts like prosecutor Rockne Harmon of Alameda County, California, have embraced these
guidelines as 'reasonable'" and concludes "But for the most part forensics experts say, the new
NRC rules offer a rationale for practices that the courts are already adopting." Eliot Marshall,

Academy's A bout-Face on Forensic DNA (National Research Council Report on DNA
Fingerprinting), 272 science 803, 803-04 (1996).
5. The distinguished geneticist Richard Lewontin reportedly criticized the composition of
the second NRC committee and quarrels with its treatment of error. Marshall, supra note 4.
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scientists who have opposed each other in court necessarily differ on the value
they place on the two types of error the legal system can make: acquitting the
guilty or convicting the innocent.6 If that were the issue, DNA's advocates

would win hands down. DNA is an extremely valuable identification
technique?far better, for example, than eyewitness testimony, which often is
treated as dispositive in determining "who did it." I know no critic of DNA
evidence who wants to return to a pre-DNA world. All, I think, agree that DNA
evidence leads to more correct convictions of the guilty and fewer mistaken
convictions of the innocent than occurred before DNA's arrival on the scene.

What has motivated my past criticisms of how DNA has figured in trials,

and, I believe, the criticisms of most of those who have urged caution in
ascribing weight to DNA evidence, is a more aesthetic criterion: namely,
evidence presented to a jury with the convincing rituals and trappings of
scientific evidence, should be good science. This means that the assumptions
on which a scientific analysis proceeds should be well-grounded in empirical
data, and if statistical inferences are made, the inferences should be fair ones
that accurately capture the weight of the evidence as it pertains to questions

juries must answer. Critics acknowledge that DNA evidence should be
admitted, and most agree that statistics can help juries understand how to weigh
DNA evidence, but, the critics hold, the evidence must be presented to juries
in such a way that its uncertainties are not obfuscated nor its implications

oversold.

DNA's advocates, on the other hand, believe that from a scientific
standpoint most doubts about DNA evidence are at best overstated and at worst

mere chimera. They can point to studies that questioned the assumptions
underlying statistical methods for determining the weight of DNA evidence but
that were obviously flawed or that did not hold up to replication. And they can

point to theoretical objections to DNA evidence that proved to be empirically

unproblematic. In short, I believe that scientists on both sides of the DNA
debate sometimes wrote with passion because, as scientists, they are ordinarily
passionate about getting things right, and never more so than when core values
like lives and justice are at stake.
Scientists in both camps can point to trials where "expert" testimony for or
against the admissibility of DNA evidence seemed scientifically unjustified. In
some trials, for example, defense experts take potential problems with DNA
evidence that are at best hypothetical and quite unlikely in the context of cases
and suggest that these hypothetical difficulties pose substantial danger to the
reliability of DNA identifications. Prosecution experts, on the other hand,
occasionally misstate or let prosecutors misstate the import of their testimony

?suggesting, for example, that if a defendant's DNA matches DNA collected

6. However, the very fact that scientists came regularly to oppose each other in court or to
write articles that might be used against each other in court may explain some of the conflict's
intensity.
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at a crime scene and there is a one in a million chance that a randomly selected
person would have matching DNA there is only a one in a million chance that
someone other than the defendant committed the crime.7 There are even cases
where prosecution experts have suggested that false positive error is impossible

in DNA analysis.8
This last claim I once found particularly puzzling, for I do not believe this

claim can be made about any technique of forensic science. Then I met a
forensic scientist who told me that false positive error never occurred.
Questioning her, I learned that she meant that when intragel RFLP tests were
run, the DNA in the evidence and suspect lanes would not match unless the

DNA was in fact matching. In this forensic scientist's vocabulary, the test
results were not wrong when a match was called because the suspect's DNA
had contaminated the evidence DNA or as a result of pure coincidence. In
either case, according to this scientist, the test told the truth?the DNA in the
suspect and evidence lanes in fact matched, whatever the reason.

I. THE JURY'S CONCERN
A scientist who testifies that false positive error never happens does not
address the question the jury needs answered?namely, how likely is it that a
match would be reported'if the evidence DNA was not the suspect's. Moreover,

she risks misleading or confusing the jury because she uses language in a
specialized way that invites misinterpretation. All I can say in defense of the
scientist I talked to is that she seemed honestly to believe what she said, and no
doubt would have explained her denial of the possibility of error to a jury as she
explained it to me, if only opposing counsel asked the right questions.
The flaw in this scientist's assertion?that it did not address the question the
jury had to answer?is, I think, the most common flaw in statistical testimony
on the import of DNA matches. Although DNA statistical evidence is ordinarily

presented in terms of the probability of coincidental matches, let me use
likelihood ratios to make my point. The likelihood ratio to which scientists

7. Arguments of this type have come to be known as "the prosecutor's fallacy." See W.C.

Thompson & E.L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The
Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney 's Fallacy, 11 Law & HUM. behav. 167-87 (1987).
To appreciate the fallacy, consider a man who is in jail at the time a rape occurs in the community.
His DNA may match the DNA extracted from the rapist's semen and only one in a million people
may have similar DNA, but if we are sure that the man was in jail at the time of the rape, it is
certain that someone other than he committed the crime.

The prosecutor's fallacy need not reflect prosecutorial bias, for there are instances where
defense counsel similarly transpose the conditional, suggesting that fallacious reasoning of this
type can result from the unbiased misunderstanding of statistics. Thus, NRC II uses to the more
general phrase, "the fallacy of the transposed conditional." NRC II, supra note 3, at 153, 198.

8. For collected examples, see Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and Exaggeration in the
Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34 jurimetrics J. 21 (1993); Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The

Random Match Probability (RMP) in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35
jurimetrics J. 201 (1995).
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(implicitly) testify; that is, the ratio implied by the often vanishingly small
probabilities they present, is

P(E|H)

P(E|notH)

(1)

where E is the event that the DNA in the evidence and suspect lanes of a gel
match, and H, the hypothesis in dispute, is that the suspect was the source of the

crime scene DNA. Since identification is not the only element of guilt, a
suspect may be the source of crime scene DNA and still be innocent. As a
practical matter, however, in most cases in which DNA evidence has been used,
identification has been tantamount to guilt, for the other elements of the crime
have been conceded. So, from the usual jury point of view, we can write the
likelihood ratio for DNA evidence as:

P (DNA Match | Defendant's Guilt)
P (DNA Match | Defendant's Innocence)
or the probability that there would be a DNA match given that the defendant is

guilty divided by the probability that there would be a DNA match if the
defendant were innocent.

In presenting statistics reflecting this ratio, the state's witnesses are
speaking a specialized scientific language which, like the testimony of the
forensic scientist I mentioned, does not address the question the jury is
interested in, and, in fact, does only a little better than the scientist I described
in allowing for the possibility of false positive error. It does somewhat better

because it allows for the possibility of a coincidental match, since the
denominator of the ratio is the chance that a randomly selected person would

have DNA matching the evidence DNA. The numerator of the ratio is
conventionally taken as one, though in practice the fact that a defendant is
guilty does not guarantee a DNA match.
From a legal standard, the appropriate likelihood ratio is different. Ratio
(2) assumes the jury knows for a fact that the DNA left at the crime scene
matches the defendant's DNA, but the jury does not know this fact. The jury
only knows that someone, presumably a reputable scientist, testified that an
RFLP or PCR test showed that, by some criterion, DNA that supposedly came
from the crime scene matched DNA that supposedly came from the defendant.
The jury relies on the witness's credibility to conclude not just that the DNA
matched, but also that the sources of the reportedly matching DNA were the
suspect and the crime scene. In this respect, DNA evidence is no different from

most evidence a jury receives. The jury seldom knows at first hand facts
relevant to a case; it knows only that witnesses have reported certain facts.
For this reason, the likelihood ratio a jury hearing DNA evidence should
estimate is not likelihood ratio (2) but rather:
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P {Report of a DNA Match | Defendant's Guilt)

P {Report of a DNA Match | Defendant's Innocence)
This ratio differs from ratio (2). Consider, for example, OJ. Simpson's case.
Had DNA statistics been presented as likelihood ratios, some would have been
exceedingly small. Making the conventional assumption that the numerator is
one, one prosecution expert testified with respect to one blood sample to a
likelihood ratio of one to a trillion, since the expert claimed there was only a

one in a trillion chance that a random man's DNA would match the

evidence DNA.10 Other implied likelihood ratios were also so low as to seem

impossible if Simpson were innocent. But these likelihood ratios assume a
denominator that is an established fact rather than a report of a fact. There are,

however, at least five ways in which a match might have been reported,
assuming that Simpson was innocent. The first is that the real killer, assumed
to be a random person, had matching DNA. It is this typically low probability,
and only this probability, that the jury is given. The second is that the scientist
who reported the match was lying about her observations.11 A third possibility

is that the source of the evidence DNA was not a "random person," but a
relative of O.J.'s, for example, his child. The fourth is that a laboratory error is

responsible for the reported match. The fifth possibility is inadvertent or
intentional police contamination of evidence.
To illustrate the difference between the likelihood ratios for actual and
reported facts, consider in Simpson the report that DNA extracted from the
blood on a sock found in O.J.'s bedroom matched the DNA of Nicole Brown
Simpson. Supporting the defense argument that the match was due to police
tampering was evidence tending to establish that: (1) two police officers in a
position to plant blood on the sock were apparently willing to lie under oath to
aid the prosecution's effort.12 (2) The sock was examined three times without

9. Even this ratio, which reflects the question the jury confronts, is not quite right in RFLP
testing, for it incorporates binning procedures that treat closely matching DNA samples as having

the same evidentiary weight as more distantly matching samples so long as in both cases the
evidence and suspect samples fall within a prespecified range. I.W. Evett et al., An Efficient
Statistical Procedure for Interpreting DNA Single Locus Profiling Data in Crime Cases, 32 J.

FORENSIC SCI. SOC'y 307-26 (1992); I.W. Evett et al., An Illustration of the Advantages of
Efficient Statistical Methods for RFLP Analysis in Forensic Science, 52 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
498 (1993). On binning, see NRC II, supra note 3, at 142-48.

10. See Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence:
Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 COLO.L.REV. 859, 861 (1996).
11. The recent scandal about biased or misleading testimony from FBI scientists makes this
possibility appear more plausible than I imagined when I first noted it. See R.L. Jackson & D.G.

Savage, FBI Warns of Possible Flaws in Lab Evidence: Courts, Prosecutors, Defense Counsel
Nationwide are Told of Potential Problems Due to Alleged Misconduct, Los ANGELES TIMES,

Jan. 31, 1997, Al.
12. Officer Fuhrman's denial at trial that he ever used the word "nigger" was apparently a
lie as was Officer Vannatter's statement in a preliminary hearing that O.J. was not a suspect when

the police went to his house the night of the killing.
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anyone noticing blood, yet the stain when noticed, was larger than a quarter and
crusted so that the sock material puckered; (3) the blood had soaked through
one side of the sock and left a wet transfer stain on the other side. This was

impossible while the sock was on O.J.'s ankle, but might well happen if blood

had been dripped on the sock while it was lying flat. It could also have
happened had the blood on the sock still been liquid when Simpson took it off,
but a defense expert testified that had Simpson acquired the blood at the crime
scene, it would have dried by the time he took the sock off. (4) The chemical
preservative EDTA, present in the LAPD test tubes in which the victims' blood
was stored, was found in the blood on the sock. The FBI agent who examined
the blood admitted there was evidence of EDTA but thought there was too little
for the blood to have been in an LAPD test tube. A defense expert testified that

the EDTA level found could have characterized blood taken from a LAPD

reference tube but was too high for the blood to have been shed by a living

human being.13
Given the defense's evidence favoring a police frame up, how likely is it
that the blood on the sock would have been reported to match Nicole Brown
Simpson's blood had Nicole not shed it?14 Even one who trusts the police is
likely to estimate the chance of their malfeasance as many orders of magnitude

higher than the chance that the DNA of a randomly selected person would
match Nicole Brown Simpson's DNA at four or five loci. O.J.'s defense team
claimed that without any need to posit a police conspiracy, a similar story,
pointing either to planted evidence or unintentional contamination, could be
told about every drop of the prosecution's blood evidence.15 Even if the set of
defense stories appear unlikely to be true,16 the collective truth of the possibili?
ties they identify is far more likely than the chance that by sheer coincidence
someone with DNA identical at crucial loci to O.J. Simpson's shed blood at the

crime scene while persons with DNA identical to Ronald Goldman's and
Nicole Brown Simpson's shed blood that found its way to O.J. Simpson's back

13. Arguments 2,3, and 4 are taken from William c. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J.

Simpson Trial, 67 colo. l. Rev. 827 (1996). Professor Thompson is a Ph.D. psychologist who
has acquired considerable expertise in and written a number of fine articles on DNA evidence. He

was a member of the Simpson defense team.
14. I am framing the matter this way rather than, as in likelihood ratio (3), in terms of
Simpson's innocence because when police malfeasance rather than laboratory error is the possible

cause of a spurious match, the likelihood of a defendant's innocence may affect the probability
of malfeasance. However, a jury may not consider as evidence of guilt, the fact that a police
officer thought a person was guilty.

15. Thompson, supra note 13.
16. Reading only the defense theories and supporting evidence, as presented by Thompson,
supra note 13, the set of defense explanations for the blood evidence seem to me sufficiently
likely that if Simpson could somehow prove his innocence (for example, if proof emerged that the

killings occurred while Simpson was on the plane), few would be puzzled about how the mass of
blood evidence came to incriminate him.
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gate, his vehicle, his sock and a glove that may or may not have belonged to

him.

Thus in People v. Simpson, the chance that each match in a series of
incriminating DNA matches would be reported was substantially higher than
the likelihood that each match was coincidental.17 The information that would
have best allowed the jury to appreciate the probative value of the different
blood evidence was not the random match probabilities the state's DNA experts
testified to, but the likelihood of intentional or accidental police malfeasance.
Indeed, both the prosecution and defense agreed that the DNA matches in the
case did not occur because the actual killer, by pure chance, had DNA matching

Simpson's or because the blood of persons other than the victims was in
Simpson's Bronco, on his gate and on his sock. The prosecution and defense

disagreed only on their theories of how the DNA in the various samples
compared came to be identical. The prosecution thought it was because
Simpson was a killer, while the defense argued that O.J. was the victim of both
sloppy police work and a frame-up.

II. THE PROBLEM OF ERROR
Although the likelihood that police contaminated the DNA evidence in
People v. Simpson intentionally or through sloppiness cannot be precisely
determined, the jurors are probably as well equipped to estimate these
likelihoods as anyone, and more likely to estimate them accurately than expert
witnesses in the pay of either the prosecution or defense. Simpson is unusual,
however, in that, on the one hand, considerable evidence supports the police
malfeasance and police sloppiness hypotheses, while, on the other hand, the
prosecution took special efforts to guarantee against laboratory error. Where
possible, evidence samples were split and sent to different laboratories for
analysis. Moreover, there were many different DNA samples and different
methods were used to analyze them. The results of virtually all analyses were
what one would have expected had Simpson alone been the killer. It does not
appear that any laboratory made a mistake in reporting incriminating results,
but even if a reported match resulted from a laboratory error, there are enough
reported matches that the chance a laboratory erred in conducting one test
seems of little moment.
Ordinarily, however, laboratory error rather than malfeasance detracts most
from the probative force of a reported match.18 Although a precise probability

17. I overstate a bit here to avoid awkward writing. Some random match probabilities
presented to the jury were quite high because the analyzed DNA was relatively uninformative.
Koehler, supra note 10, at 861 (Table 1). In these cases the match probabilities given jurors were,
in my view, as large or larger than the police malfeasance probabilities. The textual discussion fits

best the multilocus matches, especially those based on RFLP technology.
18. The likelihood that sloppy evidence handling by the police caused the DNA match is also
probably higher than the probability of intentional police malfeasance, but we know even less
about this probability than we do about the likelihood of laboratory error.

446 37 JURIMETRICS

After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRCII
cannot be associated with the chance of laboratory error, error rates in other
types of forensic laboratory tests19 and the results in the few blind proficiency
tests done to date suggest that false positive error rates in DNA tests must be
many orders of magnitude higher than the random DNA match probabilities
often given juries. If so, the probative value of a DNA match is always limited
by the chance of false positive error. Jurors may not, however, realize this, even
if they are not misled by experts claiming false positive errors cannot happen.
This is why I once suggested that the honest scientist's testimony ordinarily
should emphasize the likelihood that she is erroneously reporting that the
evidence and suspect samples match, rather than the probability that a random
person left the evidence DNA.20 If jurors are given both the false positive error
and random match probabilities, they may tend to see the probative value of the
evidence as somewhere between the two probabilities rather than treating the
chance of a false positive report as limiting the probative value of the reported

match.21

We do not, however, know what DNA laboratory error rates are, and they

are extremely hard to estimate accurately. The obvious way to estimate
laboratory error rates is through blind proficiency testing. Here we encounter,
at the outset, a problem of nomenclature. Although one might think that if a test
is blind a laboratory does not know it is being tested, in the forensic laboratory
world a blind test can refer to a situation where a laboratory knows it is being
tested and is blind only to what the test results should be. These so-called blind
tests can be expected to understate error rates, for laboratory technicians can
take special care when they know they are dealing with test samples.
Constructing truly blind DNA proficiency tests, which some in the forensic
laboratory world call double blind tests, is difficult and expensive. Not only
must test samples be confounded and degraded as crime scene samples often
are, but agencies that ordinarily submit samples to labs must appear to be the
source of the test samples. This requires contact people who appear to be police
or prosecutors submitting DNA evidence, and the labs must receive the kinds
of crime and suspect information they typically acquire. Almost none of the
proficiency testing done to date or planned for the future is truly blind in these
ways. Moreover, the less susceptible DNA testing is to error, the greater the
number of proficiency tests needed for error to emerge. Thus, absent a legal

mandate and infusion of funds, one cannot expect to generate reliable,

19. Joseph Peterson et al., Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Research
Programs: Final Report 251 (1978) (table 89).
20. Richard Lempert, The Honest Scientist's Guide to DNA Evidence, 96 Genetica 119

(1995).

21. Lempert, supra note 2. Some support for this hypothesis has emerged from Jonathan

Koehler's empirical research. Koehler et al., supra note 8. The Koehler study used a highly
simplified stimulus to elicit probability estimates. It is a typical first step in investigating how
jurors behave, but the study should be replicated with a videotaped trial and mock jurors who
deliberate in order to confirm Koehler's finding.
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empirically-based estimated error rates through truly blind proficiency testing.
Instead the best estimates of error rates we are likely to achieve will come from
tests using casework quality samples of unknown character. Because laborato?
ries receiving these samples will know they are test samples, error rates on
these tests may substantially underestimate actual casework error rates.22

Assuring adequate proficiency testing is, however, only part of the
problem. Even if proficiency tests were frequent, it can be hard to know what
to make of test results in subsequent litigation. Indeed, determining error rates
can itself be problematic. In 1988, for example, a California crime laboratory
returned one false positive error in 50 casework quality DNA samples they
were sent to identify.23 This appears to translate into a 2% error rate as one in
50 samples was incorrectly matched. However, as Kathryn Roeder pointed out,
each of the 50 samples was compared with every other sample, meaning that
there was just one false positive error made in 1225 comparisons, yielding a
more respectable error rate of .0816%.24 But Roeder's number understates the
error rate because some samples matched in pairs or as triads, meaning false

positive errors were not possible in these comparisons. Moreover the false
positive that was reported was due to cross-contamination when two samples
were stored next to each other during the test preparation. With 50 samples
none was proximate to most of the others in the proficiency test, but in actual

cases evidence and suspect samples might always be proximate if the
proficiency test sample handling procedure were followed. If so, the 2% error

rate may be a better estimate of the likelihood of casework error than an
estimate based on the number of comparisons that were made. The laboratory,
however, responded to its mistake by revising its test protocols to emphasize
the need to keep stores of evidence and suspect DNA at some distance from
each other. So what is one to make of the likelihood that this laboratory would
make a false positive error in the next actual case it handled?

22. The extent to which knowledge exists will depend on laboratory practice. A laboratory
does not have to tell its DNA analysts that particular samples are test samples, and if a laboratory
routinely keeps crime information from its analysts until the analysis is concluded and a report
filed, casework quality samples known by the laboratory but not its analysts to be test samples
may adequately substitute for truly blind test samples. Since, as discussed below, there are other

good reasons for keeping crime-related information from DNA analysts, this should become
standard laboratory practice. A laboratory which did this would still have to resist the temptation

to assign its most capable analysts to the test samples, as apparently happened in some early
California proficiency tests, and to leak information that the samples are tests. Since a laboratory's
business may be harmed by a single proficiency test error, the temptation to alert analysts to tests

may be hard to resist.
23. The testing was conducted by CACLD, the California Association of Crime Laboratory
Directors and involved three laboratories tested over two years. Another laboratory also made a
false positive error and several other reports were questionable. See California Association of

Crime Laboratory Directors, Report to the Directors (1988).

24. Kathryn Roeder, DNA Fingerprinting: A Review of the Controversy, 9 stat. sci. 222,

244 (1994).

448 37 JURIMETRICS

After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRCII
If these complications were not enough, there are additional ones. Not all
false positive proficiency test results would yield false positive reports at trials
if they involved actual casework. In actual cases, tests may involve several

samples of evidence DNA, or the defendant may run his own test. Inconsistent
results would alert analysts to the possibility of error.
More subtly, the actual likelihood of false positives for a laboratory of a
given quality depends on the true positive base rate in samples submitted for

testing. Suppose, for example, that a laboratory prone to make one false
positive error for every 10 non-matching samples it analyzes participates in a
series of blind proficiency tests. If the laboratory over time tested consecutively
100 non-matching test pairs, ten reported matches would be expected. If 10
matches were in fact reported, it might seem we had an accurate measure of the
laboratory's false positive error rate. But what is that error rate? It is true that
false positives were reported in only 10% of the cases analyzed, but among the
analyzed cases every reported match is false, so the error rate among reported
positives is 100%. It is this probability rather than the 10% error rate that
directly concerns the jury. That is, the jury wants to know, given that a match
has been reported, how likely is it that it is false. A jury which heard each of the
ten mistaken cases might, with but a little additional evidence, convict in most

of them if told that the laboratory's error rate was only 10%. The jurors would
reach the right answer only if they learned that all of this laboratory's positive

reports were mistaken. Now take a different laboratory with the same
propensity to make false positive errors. Suppose it too was tested with 100
paired samples, but 90 of these pairs had matching DNA while 10 did not. This
laboratory would presumably make just one false positive error. If juries were
presented with the 91 cases in which this laboratory reported a match and were
told that its false positive rate was 10%, there would probably be too many
acquittals. If on the other hand, the juries knew that the laboratory was mistaken
in only one of 91 matches it reported, they would be more conviction-prone and

get more cases right.
Now let us return to the real world of proficiency testing. False positive
rates are typically measured by the proportion of non-matching comparisons in
which matches are reported. But as the examples illustrate, the implications of
this error rate for the likelihood that a particular reported match is erroneous
depends on the proportion of true matches in the cases the laboratory analyzes.
In the real world, unlike the example we created, this likelihood is not only

unknown, but it may also vary with time and place. If in one jurisdiction
prosecutors, facing substantial budget constraints, screen out most weakly
suspected individuals, even a laboratory with a moderately high false positive
rate will report mainly true positives. In the extreme case where the police
always get their man, even the most sloppy laboratory will report no false

positives. The justice problem will be to avoid dismissing cases when the
laboratory reports non-matches. Conversely, if a prosecutor uses DNA testing

as a brute screening tool to eliminate weakly suspected individuals, even a
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careful laboratory, with low false positive rates as measured by proficiency
testing, can be mistaken in more than negligible proportion of its reported

matches.

Consider, for example, two laboratories, A and B. Proficiency tests reveal
that laboratory A reports a match in 10 of every 100 non-matching cases it is
given, while laboratory B is similarly mistaken only once in every 100 non
matching cases. Let us locate laboratory A in a state where prosecutors pay for
DNA testing from their own budgets and so seek to test only serious suspects,

and laboratory B in a state that pays for local DNA testing and so induces
prosecutors to use DNA tests for screening weak suspects. To keep things
simple, let us also assume that neither laboratory makes false negative errors;
that is all true matches are correctly identified. Laboratory A, let us suppose,
receives only 109 cases a year of which 99 involve the perpetrator, and 10 do
not. Laboratory B gets more cases involving perpetrators because prosecutors

spread their net so wide?let us say 180 such cases?but it also receives the
cases of2,000 innocent men. In these circumstances, only one of 100 matches
reported by laboratory A will be erroneous, so only 1% of the matches they
report will be mistaken. Laboratory B will report 200 matches and be mistaken
in 20 of them, or 10% of the matches it reports. Thus, different guilty base rates

among those tested yield reporting error rates that reverse the error rates
indicated by proficiency testing.
An implication of this example is that the chance that a reported match is
a false positive is greatest when the other evidence in the case is weak. (Prior
probabilities of guilt could be substituted for base rates in our example.) Of
course, these are the cases in which the DNA evidence is most important to

securing a conviction. In typical cases where there is substantial non-DNA
evidence implicating a defendant, a report of a DNA match, is almost certainly

accurate, but it will often be mere window dressing as far as securing a
conviction is concerned.
Thus, we see that estimating what, from the jury's point of view, is the
case-relevant error rate is a more difficult enterprise than one might expect,
since it turns on more than administering an adequate number of well designed
proficiency tests.25 Nevertheless, the essential point should not be lost. The
probability that a positive report is false in those cases where this possibility
most matters; that is, in cases where, apart from a DNA match there is little
incriminating evidence, is likely to be much greater than the random match
probabilities juries are today given and higher than the false positive rates well
conducted proficiency tests would reveal.

25. If DNA evidence were presented in a Bayesian framework, following the suggestions of
Professor Kaye in his article, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics and the Courts,

7 Harv J. L. & Tech. 101 (1993), the problem would be theoretically, and to some degree in
practice, alleviated because juror estimates of prior probabilities of guilt are estimates of base rate
guilt probabilities for individuals, who, apart from a reported DNA match, are implicated by a
certain amount of other evidence. Realistically, these estimates may be quite inaccurate.
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The report of the National Research Council's second DNA panel,26 is a
useful volume and in many ways a fine effort, but it falls down in its treatment

of error as it ducks fundamental issues. For example, it discusses the question

of whether an error rate should be included in random match calculations

without ever specifically discussing the implications of an error probability27
for the probative value of a reported DNA match. It concludes that because it
is impossible to know from proficiency tests what the probability of an error is
in a given current case, there should be no attempt to develop a statistic that
deflates a random match probability given a likelihood of error.28 Indeed,
unlike the National Research Council's first DNA report,29 NRC II refuses even
to recommend that laboratory error rates, as established in blind proficiency
testing, be admitted at trials.30 It does this while advocating procedures for
estimating random match probabilities that often will yield results certain to be
many orders of magnitude smaller than the chance of a false positive error.
We have here a failure of common sense, best explained by the way the
NRC, and perhaps the committee that produced NRC II in particular, under?

stood its mission. NRC panels are typically charged with analyzing and
summarizing the state of scientific knowledge in a particular policy relevant
area and, if appropriate, discussing the policy or action implications of their
findings. The committee that produced NRC I was funded by a consortium of

government agencies, headed by the FBI. These agencies, it is fair to say,
expected the committee's report to reflect law enforcement's great confidence
in DNA technology and to ease problems of court admissibility by categorically
rejecting certain challenges that criminal defense attorneys had begun routinely
to bring.
To say that the law enforcement community was disappointed by NRC I
is a serious understatement. Responding to the uncertainty of core assumptions

underlying the "product rule" procedures used to calculate random match
statistics and believing that the risk of this uncertainty should be borne by the
state rather than by criminal defendants, the first DNA committee recom?

mended techniques for calculating random match probabilities that were
extremely conservative.31 Although these techniques could be justified by the
values they promoted or perhaps as a second best solution to the problem of

26. NRCII, supra note 3.
27. This is not, in a given case, the same as an "error rate." This difference, between the rate

at which a laboratory has historically reported false positives and the probability it is reporting a
false positive in a specific current case, is offered by NRC II as a justification for avoiding basic

issues. NRC II, supra note 3, at 85-86.

28. Id. at 85-87.

29. NRC I, supra note 2.
30. NRC II, supra note 3, at 185.
31. Even so they could often be expected to yield random match probabilities less than one

in 100,000 or even one in 1,000,000, figures which are almost certainly smaller than any
laboratory's false positive error rate.
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laboratory error,32 their scientific justification was from the start weak in that
the "random match" probabilities they yielded were likely to be further, and
perhaps much further, from true random match probabilities than the probabili?

ties yielded by the product rule procedures the committee's recommendation
was designed to replace. Moreover, even before NRCI appeared, studies were
beginning to appear indicating that the principal scientific justification for the
committee's recommendation, the invalidity of crucial assumptions underlying
product rule procedures, was empirically of little moment. When NRC I did
appear, its recommendation to replace the product rule with a more conserva?
tive "ceiling principle" received considerable criticism from statisticians and
population geneticists.33
It was this criticism and the fact that a number of courts were following
NRC I's recommendation that led the FBI to take the initiative in sponsoring

a second DNA report.34 This report was supposed to update NRC I and to
"specifically rectify those statements regarding statistical and population
genetics issues in the previous report that have been seriously misinterpreted
or led to unintended procedures,"35 a kind way of saying parts of NRC I needed
correction without saying that the prior report's recommendations were wrong.

Against this backdrop and the fierce criticism of NRC I for allegedly poor
science, it is easy to understand why the committee that produced NRC II
ducked the statistical implications of possible error. There is no scientifically
reliable way to identify the error probability in a given case, and so in any
particular case there is no way to combine error probabilities with random
match probabilities to give a precise numerical estimate of the likelihood that
evidence DNA would be reported as matching the suspect's DNA if the suspect
were not the DNA source.
At the same time, common sense and considerable experience tell us that
random match probabilities calculated according to NRC II's recommendation
will often be far less than any reasonable lower bound estimate of the likelihood

32. Lempert, supra note 2.
33. E.g., B. Devlin, et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA Fingerprinting: A Critique of the

NRC's Report, 259 SCIENCE 748, 837 (1993); B. Devlin, et al., Comments on the Statistical
Aspects of the NRC's Report on DNA Typing, 39 J. FORENSIC SCI. 28 (1994); B.S. Weir, Forensic
Population Genetics and the National Research Council (NRC), 52 AM. J. GENETICS 437 (1993);
J. Cohen, The Ceiling Principle Is Not Always Conservative in Assigning Genotype Frequencies
for Forensic DNA Testing, 51 AM. J. GENETICS 1165 (1992).
34. Because many courts applied the Frye test, interpreted so as to require a scientific
consensus before novel scientific evidence could be introduced, NRC I's recommendation for the
application of an interim ceiling principle carried great weight. Even though scientists involved
in the forensic use of DNA evidence did not believe its application gave a valid random match
probability, all could agree that the random match probability was almost certainly no greater than
the result that ceiling principle calculations yielded. Thus there was a scientific consensus that
ceiling principle figures were a conservative upper bound but, because of the report, an apparent

lack of scientific consensus about the validity of the probabilities yielded by product rule

calculations.

35. NRC II, supra note 3, at 49.
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that a reported match falsely incriminates a suspect. However proficient
laboratories are, they are still bound to err more than one in some billions of
times. False positive errors have occurred in proficiency tests, and we know of
one wrongly incriminating report, caused by the switching of the victim's and
defendant's reference samples, that came to light during a trial only because of

the close scrutiny of chain-of-custody documents by a defense expert.36
Moreover, revelations of falsely incriminating reports emanating from the FBI
crime lab and of a West Virginia scandal involving scientific evidence that was

made up or manipulated to help win convictions in 36 cases37 suggest that
corrupt reporting or even planting evidence occurs with substantially greater

frequency than the random match probabilities often associated with DNA

evidence.

The fact that there is no scientifically valid way of estimating error or
corrupt reporting probabilities does not mean we should, as NRC II suggests,
present courts and juries with random match probabilities that pack far more of
an incriminating wallop than a reported match justifies. We must recognize that
we live in a "second best" world. The scientific defensibility of a number that
substantially overstates the deserved import of evidence (i.e., the probability
that a match will exist if a "random man" left evidence DNA) does not make
that number less likely to mislead a jury than a less scientifically defensible
number (the probability of error in a case) that addresses the issue that concerns
the jury (the probability that a match would be reported if the defendant did not

leave the evidence DNA).
Although there is no way to attach an accurate number to the chance of
error in a given case, a "second best" solution exists. One can establish a false
positive error rate for a given laboratory, if enough proficiency tests have been
done, or for laboratories in general, and based on that rate and the number of
tests done establish a 95% confidence interval around the rate, even if it is
zero.38 One may then use the upper bound of this confidence interval as an
estimated error rate. NRC II gives an example of this sort of solution and then
rejects it because it would suggest that a laboratory that makes one proficiency
test error is worse than one that makes none even where the two laboratories

have the same propensity to err. This objection is, however, beside the point.
For a jury is not charged with deciding which of two laboratories is superior,
but rather with deciding what the probative value of a reported match is. More
importantly, the estimation technique is defensible, for procedures like this are
often used in situations of inescapable uncertainty, and the number arrived at
will in most close cases be far nearer the actual false positive error probability,
which sets a limit on the probative value of a reported match, than the random

36. Thompson, supra note 13, at n.35.
37. Jackson & Savage, supra note 11.
38. NRC II, supra note 3, at 86.
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match probability the jury is now given.39 In clear cases, an error rate estimated

at the 95% confidence interval around proficiency test results will probably
yield an error probability that far exceeds the likelihood that a match has been
mistakenly reported. But with enough proficiency tests and a presumably low
error rate, the number will still be small, and together with the other incriminat?

ing evidence that makes a case clear, should guarantee a conviction.

NRC II is on track in its emphasis on the need for those handling DNA
evidence to act to reduce the chance of error. Its suggestion to split evidence
samples at the earliest possible time and to allow defendants the opportunity for
retesting40 is sound and promises to reduce the likelihood of laboratory error so
substantially that error rate estimates should suffice to secure convictions even

when DNA evidence forms the bulk of the case. Other steps that NRC II
advocates, such as accrediting laboratories and technicians, establishing regular
proficiency testing and the like, are being taken, often in response to similar

suggestions in NRC I.
A possible further step is to routinely use intergel comparisons for RFLP

matches. Currently intragel comparisons are routinely used because gel
differences introduce variation which requires larger match windows to avoid
missing true matches and this in turn leads to larger random match probabilities
across the set of common alleles.41 The loss of probative value is, however,
likely to be dwarfed by the elimination of a potential source of false positive

error, the accidental contamination of evidence DNA with suspect DNA.
Indeed the use of intergel comparisons would allow samples of evidence and
suspect DNA to be handled by different people in separate rooms from the time
the samples arrive at the lab. Minimizing the chance of laboratory error in this
way would make the probative value of intragel matches higher than that of
intragel comparisons. Moreover, if enough DNA is available, intergel matches
could be confirmed with intragel comparisons, and statistics based on the latter
comparison could then be used.

III. WHOSE DNA?
A second source of statistical overstatement in DNA analysis stems from
what the jury is told about the probability of a match if the defendant is not the
DNA source. When a DNA match is reported, jurors are almost always told the
probability that a randomly selected person of the defendant's race would have

39. In NRC IPs example, the true error rate of each of two laboratories is .10%. Determining
the 95% confidence interval estimates an error probability of .30% for the laboratory that makes
no errors in 1,000 proficiency test trials and .47% for the laboratory that makes one error in 1,000
proficiency tests. Either of these figures is likely to be far closer to the true probative value of a
reported match than the extremely low random match probabilities that the jurors would otherwise

hear.

40. NRC II, supra note 3, at 87.
41. This is because the larger the match window, the greater the proportion of the reference

population that will have alleles matching those in the tested DNA.

454 37 JURIMETRICS

After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRCII
DNA matching the evidence DNA.42 Since NRC I, it is also common to provide
jurors with similar figures for members of the country's other gross racial
grouping. Thus when the defendant is white, jurors will typically learn not only
of the chance that a randomly selected white person would have DNA matching
the evidence DNA, but also of the chances that a randomly selected black or

Hispanic person would have DNA matching the evidence DNA. These
estimated chances rest on the analysis of allele frequencies in different
convenience samples, for example, donors to blood banks in a particular city
or FBI agents in training. Within each sample, the distribution of allele sizes at
the loci analyzed are calculated for different ethnic groups so that for each
major ethnic group a frequency is attached to each allele size at each locus. The
frequencies attached to the different allele sizes are then multiplied together
following the product rule to give an overall probability that a random person

would have the same allele combination as that found in both the evidence
sample and in DNA taken from the defendant.

This procedure rests on two false assumptions. The first is that the
convenience samples from which allele frequencies are calculated are random

subsarnples of some larger racial population to which the frequencies are
attributed. The second is that the Hardy-Weinberg and linkage equilibria that
justify the application of the product rule actually exist. Yet, for the alleles
commonly used in RFLP analysis, the untenability of these assumptions seems
hardly to matter. Empirical studies suggest that conservatism in estimating
allele frequencies in the first instance can more than make up for any prejudice
an accused suffers from the untenability of the assumptions.
No statistical principle requires juries to be presented with probabilities
based on allele frequencies for the country's three major ethnic groups. Neither
is an older procedure, in which only allele frequencies for the defendant's
ethnic group were given, statistically sounder. Rather the allele frequencies of
interest are those that characterize the population of possible suspects.43 In
particular, if the arrest of a suspect is conditioned on or likely to be confined to
persons having certain characteristics, allele frequencies should ideally be based
on samples of people having that characteristic. Thus if a woman is certain that

her assailant had a Polish accent and an immigrant Pole is arrested for the
crime, the allele frequencies used to estimate how unusual his DNA pattern is
should be based on data generated from a Polish speaking sample. In a case
where nothing is known about the perpetrator except that he probably resides

somewhere near the crime scene, allele frequencies should be based on a
sample that reflects the ethnic mix in the locality in question. Only where the
perpetrator's ethnicity is known before arrest, should the jury be presented with
42. "Race" as used by DNA analysts is more of a sociological than a biological concept.
Most races DNA analysts recognize are socially constructed gross categorizations, like black and

white.

43. Richard Lempert, The Suspect Population and DNA Identification, 34 JURIMETRICS J.

1 (1993).
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DNA results for the defendant's ethnic group. But the practice of presenting
juries with information derived from samples of the defendant's coethnics or
of presenting a jury with the statistics applicable to the country's major ethnic

groups is a harmless one and most likely conservative in its implications.
Moreover, even if it does not always make statistical sense to present the jury
with statistics drawn from a black sample in the case of a black defendant and
from an Hispanic sample in the case of an Hispanic defendant, it makes a kind
of common sense and may well avoid juror suspicion of statistics that seem not
to take something as salient as the defendant's race into account. Thus, these
scientific flaws in estimating relevant allele frequencies matter little.

The serious problems that techniques for calculating allele frequencies
raise arise because the question a State's DNA expert answers for the
jury?What is the probability that a random man left the evidence DNA??is not
the question of interest to the jury. Rather the jury wants to know the probabil?
ity that some person other than the defendant left the evidence DNA. The
answer to this question differs from the answer to the "random man" question
because some people may be far more likely to be the source of evidence DNA
than an individual sampled randomly from either the world at large or from the
defendant's ethnic group. These people also may have a far greater likelihood

than a random man of having DNA that is indistinguishable from the
defendant's. Suppose, for example, a man is accused of raping his sister-in-law,

and the man's DNA matches DNA extracted from sperm taken from the
woman's vagina. It hardly matters that a random person would be unlikely to

have matching DNA. When deciding whether someone other than the
defendant might have left the evidence DNA, the jury would be most concerned
not with the likelihood that the evidence sample came from some random man,
but with the chance that it came from the victim's husband, the defendant's

brother. This likelihood will be many times greater than the likelihood that a

random man would have left the evidence DNA. Consider also the Simpson
case. If OJ. did not shed the blood drops found in Nicole Brown Simpson's
driveway, they are far more likely to have been shed by O.J.'s younger son,
who might have skinned a knee playing there, or by O.J.'s grown son, who
might have had his own grievances against Nicole Brown Simpson, than they
are to have been shed by any one random person. The jurors should be more
interested in the probability that DNA matching O.J.'s DNA came from one of
his two sons than they are in the chance that it came from some random person.

These examples, selected to make the point, are not typical, but the analysis
applies in ordinary situations. Suppose, for example, that a rape victim believes
that a man in a mugshot resembles her assailant. Later, in an identification
contaminated by her prior view of the mugshot, she picks the defendant from
a six-person line-up and upon hearing him speak says his accent is like that of
the rapist. When the suspect's DNA is tested, it matches DNA extracted from
the rapist's sperm at four loci. A random man's DNA may have a one in 50
million chance of matching the evidence DNA. A jury should, however, be less
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interested in this probability than in the chance that someone in a group
consisting of the defendant's father, five brothers, nine cousins, and two uncles
has DNA matching the defendant's at the loci tested. These people may all live
near the crime scene; they may all resemble the defendant and hence the rapist,
and they may share a common accent. But for the fact their mug shots were not
shown to the victim, they all may have been as likely as the defendant to be
arrested for the crime. Moreover, if the defendant had an ironclad alibi, they

and not some randomly selected person would be the people on whom
suspicion would fall. The probability that at least one of these relatives has
DNA matching the evidence DNA is far higher than the likelihood that some
random person has matching DNA.44
In determining how likely it is that someone other than the defendant left
the evidence DNA, the "others" of concern to the jury are only those who might
plausibly be suspected of having left the evidence DNA if the defendant did
not. I have elsewhere called this group the "suspect population." This popula?
tion is not, however, confined to others who might be suspected of the crime.
As in the example of the rape victim's husband or Simpson's younger son, it
includes people who might have innocently left what is thought to be evidence

DNA. In other words, the suspect population includes all people who might
plausibly be thought to be the source of what seems to be evidence DNA if the
defendant is not the source.

Often there is little reason to believe that anyone with easy access to the

crime scene was more or less likely than any other such person to have

committed the crime if the defendant did not. Here the likelihood that a random

person might have left the evidence DNA is the relevant statistic, except that
if a defendant's close relatives are in the suspect population, the "other" match

probability should reflect their presence. Sometimes this requires no special
calculations. Consider, for example, a suspect population of one million people,

with a one in ten million chance that a random person would have left the
evidence DNA. Suppose further that the defendant's brother is a member of the
suspect population, and that there is one chance in a thousand that the brothers

have matching DNA. If there is no more reason to suspect the defendant's
brother of the crime, assuming the defendant's innocence, than there is to
suspect any other member of the suspect population, the probability that a
random draw from the suspect population would yield an individual with
matching DNA is 101 in a billion when the brother's presence is taken into
account, hardly more than the random man estimate of one in 10 million that

ignores the brother. In these circumstances, match probabilities may be
calculated without giving special attention to the brother's possible guilt.

Suppose, however, that the criminal is known to be a young man who
resides in an apartment building that has 100 young male occupants, including
the defendant's brother. Now the suspect population numbers 100, and the

44. See NRC H, supra note 3, at 113 (equations 4.8,4.9).
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brother's presence means that there is about a one in 100,000 chance that the

defendant's DNA would match the crime scene DNA if the defendant were
innocent. This is quite a bit higher than the random man probability of one in
10 million which would apply if the brother lived elsewhere. Finally suppose
that in addition to the DNA match the evidence implicating the defendant
consists of the victim's somewhat hesitant eyewitness identification, the floor
she saw her assailant take an elevator to after he left her, and the discovery of
the victim's jewelry in the defendant's bedroom. The defendant's brother, who

looks like the defendant and shares a bedroom with him may be, we shall
assume, about 500 times more likely to have assaulted the victim if the
defendant did not than any of the 99 other young males living in the apartment

building. Now the probability of finding a DNA match if the defendant is
innocent is a little more than eight in 10,000, not much below the one in a
thousand probability that the brother's DNA would match.
We see from this example that the relevant match statistic, if it could be
derived, is an average that turns on the number of people in the suspect
population and a likelihood that each has DNA matching the defendant's DNA,
weighted by the probability that each committed the crime if the defendant did
not. If relatives are no more likely than others to have committed the crime and

the suspect population is large, providing a jury with random match statistics
is not misleading because the prior probability that the relative did it is very
small. But if relatives form a substantial portion of the suspect population, or
if evidence apart from the DNA match makes them prime alternative suspects,
the random match statistic is a misleading measure of how unlikely it would be
to find a DNA match if the defendant were innocent.

The weighted average statistic I propose, unlike the "random man" match
statistic, tells the jury how surprising it would be to find a DNA match if the
defendant is innocent. The presence of the defendant's relatives in the suspect
population can make this far less surprising than the random man statistic
suggests. However, neither the random man statistic nor the statistic I propose

addresses the question the jury is most interested in; namely, given a DNA
match, how likely is it that the defendant and not some third party committed

the crime?

The average likelihood that someone in the suspect population has DNA
matching the defendant's can never exceed the likelihood that the defendant's

closest relative has matching DNA at the loci examined. As people join the
defendant's closest relative in the suspect population, the average probability

that someone in the suspect population has matching DNA will diminish,
making it appear more likely that the defendant is guilty. But the appearance
of the defendant's increased guilt is misleading. Adding potential suspects can
only diminish the likelihood that the defendant is guilty, for adding suspects
increases the chance that some other person who might have committed the
crime has matching DNA. This increase can be substantial if the additional
suspects are related to the defendant. Consider an extreme case. Suppose the
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defendant, who has been identified solely on the basis of a DNA match, is an
identical twin, but police records show his twin was in jail at the time of the
crime and so is not in a large suspect population. The DNA evidence may be
powerfully incriminating both in the sense that given the population of suspects
it would be very surprising to find DNA matching the crime scene DNA if the
defendant were innocent and in the sense that given the distinctiveness of the
allele combination, it is very likely that the defendant and not someone else
committed the crime. Now suppose it turns out that the defendant's twin had

been inadvertently released before his sentence expired so that his earlier
exclusion from the suspect population was mistaken. If the suspect population
is large enough, including the twin in it would, if the defendant were innocent,

do little to diminish our surprise that the defendant's DNA matched the
evidence DNA, since before the DNA was analyzed there was no particular
reason to suspect the twin. Nevertheless, including the defendant's twin
diminishes substantially the probative value of the match, for now we can
conclude from the fact of the match a probability of defendant's guilt that is at
best slightly less than 50%.45 A similar diminution in the probative value of a
DNA match occurs when large numbers of a defendant's close relatives are in
the suspect population.
The random match probabilities ordinarily given juries do not attempt to

correct for the presence of relatives in the suspect population. This is one
reason why they can mislead jurors about the probative implications of a DNA
match on the question that most concerns them, which is not how surprising is
it to find a match if the defendant is innocent but rather, given other possible
perpetrators, what does the fact of a match say about the likelihood of the
defendant's guilt. The danger of this type of confusion exists not just when
there are numbers of relatives in the suspect population, but also, in principle,

whenever the suspect population is large relative to the reciprocal of the
random match probability. Thus, if the random match probability is one in a
million and there is a suspect population of five million, it is quite likely that
several potential suspects have DNA matching the evidence DNA. Indeed, as
surprising as it is that the defendant's DNA matches the evidence DNA, the
match only indicates that the defendant is one of several men who might, if the
DNA match is dispositive, be guilty. The small chance of the DNA match does
not mean there is little chance the defendant is innocent. The expected chance

of the defendant's innocence based on the DNA evidence alone is, in our
example, about eight in ten, which should mandate an acquittal rather than
serve as proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

This argument, however, comes perilously close to exemplifying what
Thompson and Schumann call "the defense attorney's fallacy."46 It is seldom
true that statistical evidence indicating that the defendant is one of several

45. The probability is less than 50% because of the chance of false positive error.

46. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 7.
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people who might have committed a crime means that there is only a one in

several chance that the defendant is guilty. Arguments to this effect are
ordinarily fallacious because statistical evidence is seldom the only evidence
pointing to the defendant. Thus, if a man identified by a rape victim has no alibi
and shortly after the rape has scratches on his face and neck, the fact that his
DNA matches the rapist's DNA with a random match probability of one in a
million makes for an overwhelming case of guilt even if the suspect population
is so large that it is likely to contain several other people with matching DNA.
We do not worry about these unknown people because they are unlikely to be
incriminated by the other evidence in the case. But the same argument is not
fallacious if other evidence implicating the defendant is also likely to implicate

those possessing matching DNA. The presence of relatives in the suspect
population poses special problems because not only is the likelihood of
matching DNA far higher for a close relative than for a randomly chosen
person, but also because a close relative is more likely than a randomly chosen
person to share other characteristics, like neighborhood of residence, facial
appearance and accent, that may implicate the defendant in the crime.

As DNA tests become more discriminating, the problems posed by
relatives in the suspect population will become less acute, but today the best
way to deal with the potential problem is to test all fairly suspected relatives
and exclude them as possible contributors of the evidence DNA, or, if a relative
is not excluded, to run further tests until he or the defendant is excluded. This
is the approach recommended by NRC II, which also provides a formula for

estimating the probability that a relative who cannot be tested has DNA
matching the incriminating DNA profile.47
But NRC II does not go far enough. Rather than report the probability of
matching DNA for each untested relative who is a plausible alternative suspect,
the state's expert should report the probability that matching DNA would be

found in at least one suspected relative and, if this number is high, the
probability that more than one relative would have matching DNA. This
recommendation, like NRC IPs recommendation to test suspected relatives is,

however, likely to be undermined in practice by failures to perceive that
relatives are plausible alternative suspects. Since investigations typically stop
when police think they have the culprit, it will be easy to overlook relatives
who might have committed the crime because no evidence suggesting they "did
it" will be gathered. If, for example, an eyewitness identifies a criminal in a
lineup and DNA evidence confirms the identification, the police are unlikely
to then present the defendant's brother to the witness in a lineup as a check.
That might reduce the certainty of the witness's earlier identification and make
the case against the defendant harder to prosecute.
Thus the list of fairly suspected relatives for the purpose of triggering the

NRC's recommendation regarding relatives should not be limited to those
47. NRC II, supra note 3, at 113.
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whom the police regarded as plausible suspects. Rather the defendant should
be allowed to name any close relatives whom he thinks might have committed
the crime. This, in turn, should require the state to replace its random match
statistic with a statistic showing the likelihood that at least one named relative

has DNA like the defendant's unless the state excludes each named relative
through DNA testing or exculpatory non-DNA evidence or by showing that

substantial non-DNA evidence of a sort unlikely to implicate the relatives
implicates the defendant.48
Arguments that resemble the defendant's fallacy are also not fallacious
when the defendant is picked out by a DNA match from a DNA data bank. If
a data bank is large enough and random match probabilities not very small, a

match might be expected even if everyone in the data bank is innocent.
Moreover, when the DNA of many people is examined, finding a match is less

surprising than when the DNA of only one person is examined. NRC I
recommended that the resulting statistical problems be dealt with by examining
alleles other than those used to select the suspect and, if these alleles confirm

the selection, using only their collective frequencies to estimate random match

probabilities.49 NRC II rejects NRC I's proposed solution because of the
information it sacrifices and recommends instead simply multiplying the
random match probability by the number of people in the data bank.50
NRC IPs solution is in my view a step backward. If, for example, one had

a DNA data bank of ten million people, NRC IPs solution would suggest that
a match was guaranteed whenever the multiplied random match probability was
greater than one in ten million, and this is not true. There is also little reason to
reject NRC Ps more cautious approach51 in a situation where a lack of any prior
cause for suspicion makes the accidental identification of an innocent person
far more likely than when a person already suspected is tested.52
There are two other problems with NRC IPs solution, both of which stem
from a failure to consider the suspect population and the fact that the jury's
concern is not with the surprising nature of the match but rather with who else
48. Since the evidence the state is required to produce relates to a preliminary question of
admissibility?whether the state is required to limits its statistical evidence to evidence showing
the likelihood that at least one named relative has matching DNA?the judge rather than the jury

would evaluate the state's evidence.

49. NRC I, supra note 2, at 124.
50. NRC II, supra note 3, at 161.
51. If DNA data bases grow very large, NRC II's approach may be more cautious, in the
sense of yielding higher random match probabilities, in certain instances. In these circumstances,
however, I would argue that the caution is excessive as compared to NRC Ts solution.

52. In certain rare circumstances, the quantity of DNA may counsel against NRC I's
recommendation, but with the development of PCR technology this is unlikely to be a substantial

problem. Moreover, the original identification can and should be made using the minimum
number of alleles required to select someone uniquely from the data base. Finally, not all
information from the selection match is lost since a jury should be able to appreciate the additional

probative value that accrues when a person is selected on the basis of a match on some alleles and
the selection is confirmed by a match on other alleles.

SUMMER 1997 461

Lempert
might have committed the crime. In some situations, a DNA data bank might
include virtually all potential suspects, and a unique identification from the data
bank can be dispositive of a guilt even if the random match probability is quite
high. If, for example, a rape occurred in a remote Arctic air base and the DNA
profiles of all men stationed there were available, a unique DNA match with a
random match probability of one in 100,000 would be more probative of guilt
than a DNA match with a random match probability of one in ten million in a
situation where only one soldier was tested and the DNA profiles of the air
base's other men were unknown. Conversely, where the suspect population is

large and not confined to the data bank, NRC IPs suggested correction is
inadequate because it only reveals how surprising it is to find a match within

the data bank but says nothing about how unlikely additional matches are
within the suspect population. Since there is no cause, apart from the match, to
think the person selected is more likely to be the culprit than any other person

in the suspect population, the suspect population's size must be considered in

a way that is not required when other evidence first inculpates a suspect.
Suppose, for example, that there are 1,000 people in a data bank and that some
person's DNA matches the evidence DNA with a random match probability of
one in a million. Multiplying this figure by 1,000 to yield a match probability
of one in 1,000 can be substantially misleading. If the suspect population is ten
million, it is far more likely than not that the person is innocent, for one would
expect nine other equally plausible suspects to have matching DNA,53 yet a jury
may conclude from the one in 1,000 figure that it is quite likely the person
identified is guilty.54

IV. THE EITHER-OR OF MATCH-BINNING
The final set of statistical issues I shall address results from the match
binning procedures that are the most common basis for deriving DNA statistics.
From a justice standpoint, these are probably the least consequential of the

errors that are common in the presentation of DNA statistics, but they
nevertheless should not be made and occasionally may prove consequential. In
RFLP analyses using match-binning procedures, the DNA analyst first decides

if a suspect's DNA matches evidence DNA. If the analyst concludes that a

53. Two interesting issues I shall ignore are the implications for this analysis of the fact that

many DNA data banks consist only of convicted criminals or convicted sex criminals and how
specifically incriminating evidence discovered after the DNA identification should qualify my
argument. In both situations, the specific details of the crime and the additional information are
likely to affect the analysis.
54. The reported match has substantial probative value in the hypothetical, for it makes it
far more likely that the person identified is guilty (i.e., was the source of the evidence DNA) than
it would be without the evidence. However, the probative value of the match is not nearly enough

given the size of the suspect population to justify the conclusion that the person identified is
probably guilty. Yet, the small random match probability given the jury may, even after taking
account of the data base size, make it appear to the jurors as if the identified person is quite likely

to be guilty.
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match exists, she then calculates the probability of a coincidental match based
on the frequencies with which alleles of the size found appear in a population
data base.55 With this technique all matches are treated as if they are of the

same quality?perfect matches within specified standards?for purposes of
statistical calculations.
Others have pointed out how match-binning procedures lose information.
Not all matches are the same. When the allele sizes of the evidence and suspect
samples differ by, for example, 2%, the evidence is not as incriminating as it

would be if the difference were only half of a percent. Yet, frequency
calculations in each case will be based on the same match window and any
suspect allele within the window will be declared a match.56 Conversely, if the
discrepancy between an allele in the evidence DNA and an allele in the suspect

DNA exceeds a match window, a match may not be called, though if the

discrepancy is small and other alleles match there may be substantial reason to
believe the DNA from the two samples had the same source. As other writers
have noted this problem and indicated how Bayesian methods can avoid match
calling problems, I shall not deal further with this issue.57
What concerns me more are the statistical implications inherent in the
subjectivity of matching procedures.58 While the process of declaring a match
is presented as an objective, scientific one, there can be a substantial subjective

aspect to it. Although computer-assisted procedures are used to determine
whether two alleles fall into the same match window, analysts can, and do,
override the computer's judgment. There are also situations in which evidence

and suspect DNA apparently do not match, but analysts nevertheless call
matches. For example, evidence and suspect DNA may closely match on seven
bands, but there may be an eighth band in one sample that has no counterpart
in the other. If the extra band in, let us say, the evidence DNA, indicates an
actual allele and if the allele is actually absent from the suspect's DNA, then the

two samples have different sources, and the suspect can be excluded. But an
analyst may attribute the extra band, particularly if it is fainter than the others,

55. The frequency count may be based on floating bins which involves searching a data base
and counting all alleles whose lengths vary by a certain amount from the size of the evidence
allele examined or, more commonly, on fixed bins, which have in advance grouped data base
alleles into bins based on size and determined the proportion of the data base population with
alleles in each bin. NRC II endorses floating bin based counts where their use is feasible. NRC II,
supra note 3, at 161.
56. The match window is the range within which a DNA analyst will call evidence and
suspect DNA samples the same. Thus, if a match window is + 2.5%, any time the length of suspect
DNA measured in base pairs is within 2.5% of the length of the evidence DNA, a match will be

called.

57. See, e.g., Evett et al., supra note 9; D.H. Kaye, The Relevance of "Matching"DNA: Is
the Window Half Open or Half Shut?, 85 J. crim. L. & criminology 676 (1995).
58. For a detailed treatment of this issue which emphasizes the subjectivity that can exist,
see William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, The Meaning of a Match: Sources of Ambiguity in the
Interpretation of DNA Prints, in Forensic DNA technology (M. Farley & J. Harrington eds.,

1991).
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to an extraneous cause like bacterial contamination and declare a match
regardless.
Analysts who call matches in circumstances like these are not cheating. If
they are competent and honest, their decisions are likely to be correct, and we
would be throwing away valuable evidence if whenever ideal matching criteria
were not met we assumed that evidence and suspect DNA had different sources.
Indeed, there is nothing wrong with analysts who, when faced with probative
but not perfectly matching patterns, discard their preferences for frequentist

procedures and become crude closet Bayesians.
In these circumstances, however, the same match-binning statistics are

presented to juries as are presented in the case of ideal matches. A match
having been called, the same bin frequencies and calculation algorithms are
used to provide random match statistics. But given that the jury is concerned
not with the likelihood of a DNA match but with the likelihood that a DNA
match would be reported, applying the ordinary match-binning product rule

calculations overstates the evidentiary import of the called match. If, for
example, a DNA analyst calls a match where seven of an evidence sample's
eight bands match bands in the suspect sample, and the eighth has no
counterpart, then the jury should be told not the probability of a seven-band
match but the probability that seven bands in a suspect sample would match any
seven of eight bands in the evidence sample because, regardless of which band
had not matched, a match might have been reported to the jury.59 Although the
random match probabilities presented to juries would diminish somewhat, it is

unlikely that much probative force would be lost, and to the extent this
happens, the loss is appropriate.
So long as match-binning procedures contain any subjective element, there
is a more important further reform to be made in DNA testing. While working

on a case, DNA analysts sometimes know of the other evidence against a
defendant. Being human, they may be influenced by this information. If they

are, jurors considering a match may, without knowing it, be weighing
information that reflects not just DNA results, but also either inadmissible
evidence or evidence admitted in the case and already considered by the jurors.
Moreover, the DNA analyst only hears the untested police side of the story. If
hearing this induces an analyst to call a match where she otherwise would have

labeled the results indeterminate, the state may secure evidence powerful

enough to convict even when the defense proves at trial the unreliability of the
evidence that influenced the analyst's subjective call. Except for a few limited

purposes, such as information about the likely number of assailants in a rape

59. This is a conservative suggestion since it might not be all seven band matches that the
analyst would call matches but only those in which the eighth band in the evidence sample was
faint or otherwise seemed attributable to something other than the evidence DNA. However, in

a setting where, as the recent FBI lab scandals indicate, forensic scientists tend to make
discretionary calls so as to favor the state, statistical conservatism in interpreting those calls
appears justified.
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case, there is no scientific reason why a DNA analyst should know anything
about the crime or the evidence against the defendant. Until all subjective
elements are eliminated from DNA test procedures, laboratory protocols should
preclude providing unneeded information about the crime or defendant to DNA
analysts. Indeed, even if subjectivity played no part in interpreting DNA test

results, analysts should not receive crime specific information, because
certainty of the suspect's guilt can induce carelessness or even corruption. NRC
II should have taken a firm position on this.

DNA comparisons are, next to fingerprinting, forensic science's most
powerful identification technique. Techniques of DNA identification and
procedures for calculating random match probabilities are, generally speaking,

scientifically sound. But this does not necessarily make standard practices
regarding the presentation of DNA evidence in court good forensic science. In
fact, DNA evidence is routinely evaluated and presented in court in ways that
risk substantially overstating its incriminatory power. This is largely because
the state's DNA experts aim their testimony toward the questions which the
science of DNA identification can answer: (1) Does the suspect's DNA match
the evidence DNA?,60 and, if so, (2) if someone were to be selected at random
from an appropriate larger population, how likely is it that his DNA would

match the evidence DNA?61 The question that the forensic science of DNA
identification should answer?How likely is a report of a DNA match if the
defendant did not leave the evidence DNA??is typically ignored by the state's
experts except to the extent that they are forced to grapple with aspects of it on

cross-examination. Even when a prosecution expert does address an issue
relevant to the likelihood of a reported match; information about this likelihood
does not figure in the statistics the expert uses to convey the probative force of
the DNA evidence to the jury.

It is the disjunction between the science questions of DNA identification
and the forensic science question62 that has made this an awkward issue for the

60. For ease of exposition I am assuming here, as I have throughout this paper, that the
evidence DNA is DNA containing evidence left by a criminal at a crime. It is, however, also
common to finger criminals by showing that blood or other DNA containing evidence from a
crime victim is present on the criminal's clothes or on other possessions or in places the criminal

has special assess to. The points I make apply regardless of whether the evidence DNA is

attributable to the criminal or the victim.

61. Usually appropriate populations are considered to be populations of people who share
the same racial heritage, in its broadest sense (e.g., black, white, southwest Hispanic, etc.) as the

person suspected of leaving the evidence sample. The control made for race is often not
scientifically required, but it is usually benign as the defendant is more likely to be helped than
hurt by the control. Lempert, supra note 43.
62. While I have identified the core questions in each category, there are other questions that
are somewhat differently treated depending on one's perspective. One can, for example, treat
questions pertaining to the likelihood that a relative of the defendant will have DNA matching the
evidence DNA as a science question and give a scientific answer to it. See I.W. Evett, Evaluating
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National Research Council to resolve and has led to the publication of two
reports, neither of which is a complete success, although the second is likely to

be better received by the science community and the largely prosecution
oriented forensic science community than was its predecessor. When NRC I

was being drafted, the science was less clear than it was when NRC II was
written, and the committee that produced NRC I, perhaps because it had a
broader charge, was more concerned with legal values and the forensic science
question than the later committee was.63 Thus NRC I made recommendations
that substantially import a view of legal values into what are supposed to be
scientifically derived standards, and it devotes a good deal of attention to ways
of improving laboratory practice so that error and analytic subjectivity will be
minimized. Even so, NRC I does not fully recognize the statistical implications
of laboratory error, perhaps because its recommended technique for calculating

random match probabilities is sufficiently conservative that laboratory
error?which has more effect on probative value the more its chances exceed
random match probabilities?appears as less of a statistical problem.64 NRC II
reflects more current and sounder science than NRC I in areas where it overlaps
the earlier report, and in particular contains clear and useful treatments of a

variety of statistical issues. But it ignores or postpones for another day
important aspects of what I have called the forensic science question and the
implications this has for the statistical analyses it recommends. Thus, it argues

for giving jurors random match probabilities even if common sense and
proficiency test results suggest that the probative force of reported matches
cannot be nearly so great as these figures suggest.65 Worse, it explicitly breaks

DNA Profiles in the Case Where the Defense is It Was My Brother, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. Soc'Y 5
(1992); NRC II, supra note 3, at 113. But there remains the forensic science question which has
no determinate answer, for it depends on how plausible it is to consider a defendant's relatives as
suspects. Often the indeterminacy of the forensic science question means the science question is
never asked and the possibility a relative left the evidence DNA never affects what the jury learns
of the evidence's probative value. This is so even if the chance a relative left the evidence DNA
is substantial relative to the a priori chance the defendant left the evidence DNA.

63. The first NRC committee considered ethical issues relating to DNA evidence, the
construction of DNA data banks, the future monitoring of the technology, and other issues that
the second committee saw as beyond the latter committee's charge. The second committee saw
its role as limited to determining how the uncertainty of laboratory findings can be reduced, how
the risk of error can be minimized, how to take account of population substructure (including

relatives), and what statistical theory and empirical observations allow us to say about the
probability of DNA matches. The second committee also discussed some legal issues, focusing
particularly on the reception by the courts of the earlier NRC report.

64. The committee made a misjudgment here, for even by its recommended calculation
procedures, random match probabilities are often several orders of magnitude less than the likely
chance of laboratory error.

65. Professor David Kaye argued, in the course of some extraordinarily helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this paper, that given the adversary system it might be appropriate for the
state to present random match probabilities, leaving it to the defendant to discuss the implications
of possible error. I reject the argument because I believe the state in a criminal prosecution is not
just another adversary. As the Supreme Court indicated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
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with the recommendations of NRC I and encourages those who wish to claim
that DNA profiles are uniquely associated with particular individuals, though
the chance of error means that the report of an apparently unique DNA match
cannot guarantee a suspect's association with a crime.66 Also, NRC II, unlike

NRC I, does not caution against subjective aspects of the DNA matching
process and fails to appreciate their possible statistical implications. Finally,
NRC II conditions its recommendations for excluding relatives on the existence
of evidence that one or more relatives of the suspect are possible perpetrators67
This language appears to condition the need to exclude relatives or take account
of their likely DNA profiles on the existence of evidence that actually points to
relatives as suspects. It misses the way that evidence gathering is an active,
focused process. If, for example, an eyewitness thinks a person whose mug shot
she sees raped her, the police are likely to seek additional evidence against that
person and are unlikely to seek a picture of the defendant's brother to see if he
too looks like the rapist. Even hypothetical, unknown relatives, whose possible
presence the committee dismisses, may be plausible alternative suspects if the
defendant did not commit the crime.

But enough criticism. Let us conclude with the good news about DNA
testing. The process is so robust and the chance of error, the greatest of the
dangers I have pointed to, is ordinarily sufficiently small that overstating the
probative value of a DNA match will seldom lead to unjust convictions. When,

and other cases, the state has a special obligation to avoid concealing exonerative evidence and
to present its case so as to get at the truth. It is the state's special obligations in these respects that

underlie a number of my recommendations and the special burdens I would put on the state and
its experts. In my view, the state only does good science when its scientific analyses alone and
unrebutted are fair to the defendant. Thus, there are no pure scientific answers to the questions that

surround DNA evidence. As NRC I recognized more than NRC II, legal values have something
to say about the demands of good science.
66. The committee writes that M[t]he number of loci and the degree of heterozygosity per
locus that are needed to meet the criteria illustrated above [for uniqueness] do not seem beyond
the reach of forensic science, so unique typing (except for identical twins) may not be far off."
NRC II, supra note 3, at 138. This remark is scientifically justified in the sense that people, except

for identical twins, have unique DNA profiles and science is now at a point where enough
information about an individual's profile can be extracted. Hence, there is good ground for
thinking no one else would be the same on even the small fraction of the whole profile we can
observe. But chances of error mean one cannot make the claim which seems to follow naturally
from the uniqueness claim: namely, that DNA found at a crime scene must be the defendant's
because tests show this to match the defendant's DNA, and we can be confident that no one else

has DNA that would match. It is, however, possible that uniqueness claims will not be as
misleading as low random match probabilities. Juries may be less confused about how to use error

probabilities to deflate the likelihood of a true identification when the DNA evidence is said to
be unique than when it is claimed that DNA like that of the defendant has a chance of one over
some very large number of characterizing a random person. Possibilities like this are one reason
why it is important to implement NRC H's wise recommendation that behavioral research be
carried out to identify conditions that will cause fact finders to misinterpret DNA evidence (Id. at

42). Also uniqueness claims might be the spur courts need to make DNA experts cease
proclaiming, as some have, that false positive errors are impossible.

67. NRC II, supra note 3, at 123.
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as is usually the case, evidence other than the DNA match also implicates the
defendant, a guilty verdict will be justified even if the probative value of a
DNA match is limited to the probability of error.68 For similar reasons NRC I's
ceiling principle calculations were unlikely to produce unmerited acquittals,
and the committee members knew this when they made the proposal. With
respect to error, NRC II has made suggestions of great practical importance:
namely, that defendants be allowed, even at state expense, to secure independ?
ent laboratory tests of incriminating DNA evidence and that those receiving
DNA evidence handle it to enhance the independence of these tests. Although
this suggestion will not deal with all sources of error, such as cross-contamina?
tion in the field, and although the probabilities associated with independent
errors at two laboratories will still dwarf random match probabilities, in most
cases the conjoint probability will be so small that we will be able to say with
some confidence that laboratory handling or testing errors will not lead to
wrongful convictions. Implementing these changes will not, however, mean
that echoes of the DNA Wars will no longer remain. The battles, especially as

they were joined after NRC I, were never really over whether we would
sanction procedures that convicted innocent men or let the guilty go free.

Rather they were about the standards that good science and good forensic
science demand we achieve. On this issue, despite the National Research
Council's second DNA report, there remains room for disagreement.

68. Even in the error-filled case of People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989),
which revealed serious problems in the way DNA tests were then conducted, it appears that the
DNA profiling was in fact accurate and the defendant was guilty.
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